There is an odd n ess to Wittgenstein's corpus that derives from its history. For many years the bulk .9f its unsorted stac..ksJay in a steamer trunk und e r G. E. M. Anscom be's bed-These stacks are indicative of Wittgenstein 's perfection ist and labor-intensive editing process (a process which preven ted him from publishing an ything in his life tim e after the Tractatus ); th ey rende r apt the book titl e "Zettel" (th e German word for "sc rap of pap er") 1 a nd deprive his later wo rks of a ny sense of finality -a trait symptomatic of all his posthumously published writings. The closest thing to a "fini sh ed" manuscript afte r 1929 appears to have no more structure than a se ri e of numbered paragraphs. This oddness ca n tempt us to think of Wittgenstein's late r writings as n o thing more tha n an aggrega te of standalone aphorism s. 2 T he ca refree stance we are often guilty of taking toward hisw~h a t a ny re m ark by his h and m e rits equal attention for th e light it throws on his philosop hy; as if his ge nius were a natural phe nom e non which 11 could not fa il to express itself with equal power in all its man ifes tations. Thi s attitud e, however, makes one neglectful ofWittgcnstein 's own intentions, of the fac t th at he was ac tively strivi ng to develop hi s thought in certain di recti ons, as is made evid ent by th e co nti nual revising and reo rd erin g to whi ch he subj ec ted hi s remarks.
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With th ese words, Lars I lertzberg advises us to be alert to marks of ongoing developm ent in Wittgcnstein 's thinkin g as we read th e later corpus. 1 suggest that any development in W ittgenstcin's later th ought ca nn ot be full y appreciated if his later works are read in isolati on from th e high point of hi s early period , th e Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. G ranted, Wit:tgenstcin 's later th ought constituted a revolution aga inst th e rece ived phil osophical paradi gm of th e ea rl y twe nti eth century. Howeve r, th e nature of thi s revoluti on is widely disputed. I maintain th at Wittgenstcin's revolution is best told as th e story of character transformati on and conceptual metamorphosis th at a~un es one kind of mi.ty between Wittgenstein 's ea rl y an d_ late works.
The suggesti on of uni ty between th e "early" and "later" W ittgcnstcin is certainly not new. There is enough ambi gui ty in Wittge nstein 's writings fo r nea rly any philosophical pos ition to find a resting place . Ye t many who argue for a unity do so either by conceiving it in terms of a conceptual continuity (as if al l th e later wo rks co uld be di still ed into th eses that oppose th e ea rli er Tractatu s on a comm on ground ) or by trying to ass imilate both peri ods in hi s thinking und er a di fferent rubri c altoge th er. For exa mpl e, soon after its publicati on, th e Tractatus wa hail ed as th e fin al pi ece in the logical positivist's jigsaw puzzle. Less famously, Bernard Williams and Norman Malcolm debate th e lingering effec t of Ka nti an idealism on Wittgenstein 's writing. 4 But there is something ve ry~ittgen steinian about all such proj ec ts.
Unfortunately, wh en we look for continuity in Wittgenstein's wo rk we are tempted to lo_gk for a theoretical continuity. T hus W illiams sees a latent idealism, Mal colm hedges toward realism, James C. Edwa rds sees Wittgcnstein 's progressive emancipati on from "rationali ty-as-representation ," Fe rgus Kerr locates Wittgenstein 's work in reac tion to th e myth of th e solitary wordl ess Cartes ian ego, and so on. 5 But ca n any auth or cla im to have uncovered what Wittgenstein is reall y up to by framing th e putative "th eo ry" ~y in g und ern ea th hi~ writin g~? : suspec t th at each ". discovery" of a supposed central fea ture of W1ttgcnstcm s thought has the gnp 1t does on eac h auth or not because he or she has an obj ec tive grasp on W ittgensteinian truths, but beca use W ittgenstein has a subj ec tive grasp on th em as readers; each "dis-Working on Oneself covcry" is but a manifestation of t·heir parti cular "cure." Reading Wittgenstein ri ghtl y leads to di ve rse convictions beca use maladies differ; eac h author cham pi ons th e "Wittge nsteini an th eory" that most reAec ts th e way that he or she has escaped hi s or her own Ay-bottlc. Wittgenstein ca nnot be subsum ed without remaind er und er any theoretical framework beca use, as we shall sec, the uni ty hi s work displays is a narrative rather than a theoretical one.
Rush Rh ces is sai d to have once rema rked that th e chi ef work of Wittgenstein 's later period, th e PhilosofJhicallnvestigations, has the unity of a conve rsa ti on. Ordin aril y, it would not dawn on us to treat a conve rsation as an exe rcise in propositional logic. ("Yes, I see that your decision to se t th e orthodonti st appointment for Tuesday follows from your claim that blue is yo ur favorite color and th at Siberia may still have snow on th e ground.") If asked to "o utline" a conve rsa ti on we would be hard pressed to know what to do. Typically, conve rsa tion s cannot be reduc ed to their "essence" without great loss nor ca n th ey be fully "explain ed" apart from simpl y repeating all the words of th e dialogue. We can't even imagin e that { the ~opics tou c h e~] on betray a th ematic unity th at might be thought to un-~ derhe a conversatiOn. Rather, conversa t1on s are woven from a co rnu cop1 a of topi cs by speakers who detect ways in which eac h sentence has bea ring upon th e oth ers. The only thing that guarantees th e continuation of a conve rsa tion is th e skill of th e interlocutors to go on.
This metaphor ap tl y desc ribes the unity of th e entire Wittgensteinian corpus. The I ingui sti c (or narrative) unity of his philosophy is an express ion of Wittgenstein's own ability to "go on."]:.h~ unresolved tensions in the Tractatus foreshadow th e direc tion of hi'Sconccptual development. For th e remainder of thi s chapter I will show th at his conceptual transformation involved th e migration of th e human subject to the ve ry center of hi s attention. Wittgcnstein's revolution in philosophy was not simpl y that he had succeeded in changing th e topi cs of philosoph y but that he sought to change its subj ects. As Wittgenstein's outlook matured, it beca me more in--tcntionally ethi cal-not in the sense of providing an ethical theo ry, but in th e sense fh;;t'hc as philosopher functioned as a moral sage whose th erapy ass isted th e character transformation of concrete human selves. -----.
MIGRATION OF THE SUBJECT
One of th e ways Wittgenstein mystifies contemporary thinkers is th at he defi es class ification within th e theoretical space mapped out by Enlightenment thinkers. Wh ereas criti cal thinking seeks obj ecti vity in knowledge, Wiltgen-} stein's postcriti cal philosophy came to be preoccupied with th e un avoidabl y 1 messy way th at particul ar human subj ec ts are entangled with acts of knowing. W iltgens tein 's conceptual journ ey along th ese lines was fo reshadowed by tensions in th e content, style, and "storyline" of the Tractatus. T hese tensions resulted in Wittgenstein 's experim entati on with pedagogy and ultimately precipitated a clea r th erapeuti c meth od in phil osoph y. But th e direc ti on th at his later philosoph y was to take seems very diffi cult to envision, given th e way th e Tractatus trea ts human selves as virtuall y in visible.
Th e In visible Self
Th ere is so me ambi guity in speaking of th e "mi grati on of th e subj ec t" in W ittgenstein 's ea rly works, sin ce th e Tractatus referred to human subj ec ts in two di stinct ways. O n th e one hand, th ere is th e "psychological I," whi ch is the human bein g, th e human body, the human soul with all its psyc hological attributes.
7 T his "I" is th e hu ma n self whose id entity is bound up with th e hi story of a parti cul ar communi ty. One outspoken Wiltgensteinian comm entator, D. Z. Phillips, explains, "As D .Z.P. I am on e of a human neighborhood . I am given a name by my neighbors. I cann ot ask, 'What is ~hi story to me?' My id entity is my bi ograph y. It is on e biograph y among many." 8 However, at anoth er level, th e fact that a person ca n call th e world "my world " (as in TLP 5.62) leads many to assum e th ere must be a metaphysical subj ect doing th e possessing, a subj ect to whom th e "my" refers. T hi s is what Wittgenstein call ed, on th e oth er hand , th e "phil osophi cal I":
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The phil osophi cal I is not th e man, not th e human body or th e human soul of whi ch psychology trea ts, but th e metaph ys ical subj ec t. . . .
In contrast to th e psychological "I," the "phil osophi cal I" has no character, no history, and no nttighbors. W ittgcnstein explain ed that th e metaph ys ical subj ect is as elusive as mercury squ eezed between one's fin ge rs.
5.631
Ifl wrote a book "Th e world as I found it," I should also have th erein to report on my body and say whi ch members obey my will and whi ch do not, etc. This th en would be a method of isolating th e subj ec t or rath er of showing th at in an important sense th ere is no subj ect: that is to say, of it alone in thi s book menti on could not be made.
5.632
T he sub jec t does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.
5.633
Where in the word is a metaphysical subj ect to be noted?
As Phillips co rrectly points out, the metaphysical subj ec t ca nnot be a part of the world of experience, as th e psychological "I" can be, because it is the putative subj ec t of all experience. Even the "min eness" of experience is itself an experi ence. Therefore, this subj ect necessarily li es outside the world of experience; or better, "it is a limi t of th e world." Whereas th e psychological I is irrelevant to philosophy, th e philosophical I appears to be in--ibl e to philosophical scrutiny.
The Tractarian presumption concerning the invisibility of the subj ect may be see n in the shock ing transition seen from state ments 5.641 to 6 (Routl edge edition ):
T here is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can ta lk of a non-psychological!.
The I occurs in philosop hy through the fact that th e "world is my world".
The philosophical I is not th e man, not the human body or the human soul of wh ich psychology treats, but th e metaphysical sub ject, the limit-not part of the world.
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The general form of truth-fun ction is:
This is th e general form of a propositi on.
In one fell swoop, Wittgenstein jumped from th e nature of th e selfto symbolic logic. How could Wittgenstein tolerate this abrupt change of topics in an otherwise predictably syllogistic argument? Does this constitute a breakdown in th e argument? I th ink Wittgenstein does proceed reaso nably.
If th e metaphysical subj ec t is simply an cxtensionless point coord in ated with th e world, th en it is not worth troubling over; it simply drops out of view. Wittgenstein wanted to discard th e subj ect altogether and even pro-~ posed that language di spense with th e word "!." 9 In statement 6 Wittgenstein was simpl y ga th erin g threads from his ea rli er di sc ussion about th e world and th e log ical form that makes talking about it possibl e.
10 D iscussion about th e philosop hi cal self and "its" world reduces to disc ussion about th e world , which, in turn , redu ces to di sc uss ion about logical form and truth-functions.
The upshot of thi s tidy analysis is that th e ea rl y Wittgenstcin intentionally tri ed to minimize any attention paid to his own reader -th e concrete human subj ect who willfully leafs th e pages of th e Tractatus. This con clusion is also supported by the phys ical stru cture of the Tractatus.
Fi rst, no first-person pronoun occ urs in any primary stateme nts (those numbered 1, 2, 3 .. . 7) or secondary sta tem ents (those numbered to th e first decimal pl ace, as in 1.1, 1.2, etc. ).
11 The te nor of the logicall y important propositions is con sistentl y objective, impe rso nal, and unive rsal in such a way as to imply that concrete human persons are in cid ental to th e ...:-;---di scussion.
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Second, th e prese nc e of first-pe rson pronouns in th e elu cidatory remarks shows that concrete human selves attract Wittgenstein 's relu ctant attention only to the ex tent that th eir stu )idity threatens to blind them to Wittgenstein 's views. It is easy o ge(the impress ion that if everyone thought as clea rl y on matters as W ittgcnstein himself, he could have trimm ed the "pond erous" eighty pages down to seven simple statements, an d th en again down to just one: "W11 ereof one cannot speak, th ereof one must be sil ent." Yet, the fact that W ittgenst in paid even relu ctant attention to hi s rea ders foreshadowed th e way concrete human subj ects were to become hi s later obsess ion.
The primacy, h ere and now, of concre te human perso ns will be shown in later works by W ittgen tein 's expli cit attention to unravel ing conceptual puzzles that entangle hi s parti cular stud ents. But surprisingly, thi s shift is already anticipated by th e concessions h e grants to the readers of th e Tractatus. His use of ex tra white space is deliberately arranged to assist readers to make connections between major logical sections. Indeed, the fact that he includes elu cidation at all may be an indi cation of <!.X his willingness to compromise the philosophi cal silence for the benefit of th e rea der.
Of course, if the only chall enge I can muster to a picture of Wittgenstein as one committed to th e invisibility of th e human subj ec t in th e practi ce of ph ilosophy consists in the appearance of personal pronouns (coupl ed with judi cious use of wh ite space) in th e elu cidatory rema rks aim ed at accom modating obtuse readers, th en th e picture of W ittgenstein that emerges from th e Tractatus is one of an Enlightenment thinker par excellence. Tb effectively de£ ndmy claim th at th e unily of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be narrated as th e migration of the human subj ect that beg ins in the Tractatus, I must uncover three kinds of tension in the Tractatus that on ly make sense as anticipatiOns of Wittgenstein's later turn to the subj ect. First is th j j logi cal pu zzle of the book's conclusion. The second is th e tension between t he book's content an d1ts style. The third tension anses from th e hidd en L._,~...._ ~tory! me of th e Tractatus.
• Surmounting the Tl·actatus · )
First, it is easy to feel chea ted when one reaches th e conclusion of the 12 Was Wittge nstein's reply-an instanc e of sophomoric arroga nce, or was something else going on? Surely Wittgenstein knew that th e basis for accep ting a set of propositions as senseless ca n never be th e se nse of those very propositi ons . That a proposition lacks sense means precisely thi s, that its "mea ning" ca nnot enter into its own justification.
Yet when he reached th e point in th e Tractatus wh re he claimed that eve rything he ha s sa id up to that point was literally meaningless, we are tempted to play th e part of Anselm 's Boso and ask, "What did he mean by that?" Is this an unfair qu estion? Not if th ere is anoth er way that ineffa bl e truths can be communicated to us. W ittgenstein cl a im ed th at language is co terminous with th e world ; th e limits of language are the limits of th e world. n If we take li im literall y for a m om en t, we mu st con clude th at it makes no sense to speak about the limits, because both th e bound ary and wh at lies beyond the boundary are off limits to language . And if disc ursive reasonin g is a fun c ti on of language, th en we cann ot even "think" th e boundary: "for, in order to draw a limit to thinkin g we sh ould have to be abl e to thi nk both sid es of thi s limi t."
14 Now, th ere is no probl em in th e fac t that we are invited, even exh orted, to contempl ate the world as a limited whole so long as contempl ation (Anschauung) is linked to feeling (Ge fiihl ) rath er than thought. 15 But th ere is a p robl em in usin g language to m ake such an offe r since th e phrases "the world sub s{Jecie aetemitatis" or "th e world as a limited wh ole" (6 -45) are literally "in expressibl e" (6.522). All such notions-th e limits of th e world , das Mystische, logical form , God,-a re m etaphys ical terms; to speak th em is to speak unintelligibl y (unsinnig), for th ey are terms lacking re ference (Bedeutung) . 16 W ittgenstein co nclud ed A. that correct appli ca ti on of ph iloso phy is th e policing ofl anguage: sentences must be restricted to those of natural science, whil e putative m etaphysical claims must be debunked. H owever, the sentences ofTractatus belong neith er to natural science nor to m etaph ysics. And for this reason , th e Tractatus was just as self-stultifyin g as we re the principl e of verifi abilily (whi ch was itself unverifi able) and th e prin cipl e of falsifi ability (whi ch was itself unfalsifiabl e) .
Smi1ewhat surpri singly, W iltgenstein acknowledged this problem but did not confess it as a fa ult. W h y not? M idway through th e Tractatus Wittgen stein m ade th e istinc ti on between form and content. Pro pos itions which are false with respe~t to th eir content ca n n everth eless precipita te trustworthy conclusions by virtu e of th eir form .
17 Th e sentence, "Th e basketball is green," wh en , in fac t, th e basketball is orange, is an exa mpl e of a sen ten ce that is false with respect to content. However, such a sentence still correctly conveys th e fact th at basketballs are the sorts of thin gs th at are colorecl. This fac t is conveyed by m ea ns of th e sentence's parti cipation in th e logical form of basketball s. In this way language ca n possibly communica te th e inexpress ibl e. But there is anoth er way to read th e Tractatus that circumvents self-stultifi cation. This can be best illustra ted by a short detour into th e literary meth od of Stanley Fish. Fish makes a convin cin g case th a t a reader-response mode] of literary criti cism can best account for what otherwise might be an embarrassing spot in Plato's Phaedrus. Tra nslator Wa lter Hamilton reminds us that "th e Phaedrus has some times been desc ribed as Plato's farewell to literature," largely du e to Socrates' explicit conclusion in th e final sec tion of th e dialogue: 1o beli eve, on the one hand, that a written composition on any subj ec t must be to a large exten t the creation of fancy; th at nothing worth serious attention has ever been written in prose or verse ... to beli eve this, I say, and to let all else go is to be th e sort of man, Phaedrus, that you and I mi ght well pray that we may both become 2 0
The problem, of course, is that Socrates' pronouncement aga inst all literature seems to consign th e Phaedrus itself to th e sa me problemati c status. However, Fish argues that th e geme of Phaedrus demands that we .look for its unity not in its form al structure, as if Phaedrus were a self-contain ed artifact, but in its coherence as a function of th e interplay between the reader and th e text. 'faking this approach will enabl e us to see that Rath er than a single susta in ed argument, th e Phaedrus is a se ri es of discree t conversa tions or seminars, each with its own carefully posed question , ensuing di sc uss ion, and firmly drawn conclusion, but so arranged that to enter th e spirit and assumptions of any one of th ese self-enclosed units is impli citly to rejec t th e spirit and assumptions of the unit immediately precedi ng Fish is not simply saying that th e read er imaginatively enters into th e dialogue at th e sa me level as a main character (Pha edrus), so that th e growth of hi s or her knowledge is simply th e same in crementa], piecemeal path \ taken by Phaedrus. Rather, th e reader stands in a di alec tic with the text as ~Pi a whole, something Socrates' student would have been unable to do .
For example, Fish explains th at ea rly on th e reader is forced to deal with a contradi ction of whi ch Socrates and Phaedrus are simpl y un aware. Phaedrus recounts a speech he hea rd given by Lysias, which receives Socrates' just criti cism for its sloppy struc ture. However, when Socrates offers a wellcrafted substitute, he is forced to criti cize hi s own ve rsion for being simply a piece of rh etori c. Fish summ ari zes: "In other words, Lys ias' speech is bad beca use it is not well put togeth er and Socrates' speech is bad beca use it is well put togeth er." Wh ile th e observant reader may detec t that th e criterion for "good" has changed between th ese two criti cisms, th e cl ever reader will reali ze as well that the introdu ction of th e new stand ard "invalidates th e very basis on which th e whole di sc ussion ... had hith erto been proceeding."22 However, th e point of thi tension in th e reader's experi ence of th e text, claims Fish, is to urge th e reader not to go back and re-evaluate Lys ias' speech by th e new criteri on, but to go on:
At th at moment, thi s ea rl y sec tion of th e di alogue will have achi eved its tru e purpose, whi ch is, paradox icall y, to bring th e reader to th e point where he [or she] is no lon ge r interested in th e iss ues it treats-no longer interested because he I: or she] has come to see that the real issues exist at a hi gher level of generality. Thus, in a way pec uli ar to di alectical form and experi ence, this space of prose and argument wi ll have been the veh icle of its own abandonm entY Fish's analysis of Phaedrus illustrates th e difference between show ing I and saying that we have already enco untered in Wittgenstein. C laiming that a text shows what it cannot say is an allusion to th e performative nature oflanguage. As th e ordin ary language ph ilosoph er John L. Austin put it, th e written text becomes a speec h-a ct whose feli city depends, in part, on th e uptake by its rea cl ers. 24 To be sure, there are iss ues such as th e reader's ey sight, intelligence, and literacy that affect uptake. But th e reader's "vision" -the rea der's penchant for seein g so me aspects rath er th an others-plays a central role in his or her abili ty to "get it." T he ge nius of Plato, as expressed in th e pages of Phaedrus, is shown by the way he uti! ized th e reader-text dial ec ti c to shape th e mann er in wh ich th e reader perceives. The Phaednts is not processing an argum ent but transform ing th e reader's viSIOn.
Further, in order to transform th e reader's vision effectively, th e dialecti c which ex ists betwee n reader and th e-tex t-as-a-whol e must initiall y engage th e reader at his or her parti cul ar point of departure. "Going on" from here is not a simpl e matter of th e rea der sys temati cally abandon ing "false" beliefs and embracing "true" ones, but a matter of transcending th e con fli ct betwee n rival beliefs by seeing matters in a deeper way. But this means that if the dialectic is successful , th en, as th e reader's outl ook is changed, he or she will reac h the end of a section of a dialogue and discard it as "element<uy." To read the Phaedrus, then, is to use it up; for the va lue of any point in it is that it gets you (not any sustain ed argument) to the nex t point, which is not so much a point (in logical-demonstrative terms) as a level of insight. It is thus a self-consuming artifac t, a mimetic enactment in the reader's experi ence of th e Platonic ladder in which eac h rung, as it is nego ti ated, is kicked away. 25 The ques ti on remains, "To what ex tent does the Tractatus function~ a self-consumin g arti fac t?" W ittgenstein appears to answe r thi s qu estion inj an un charac teri sti cally straightforward mann er.
6.54
My propositions are elu cidatory in this way: he who und ersta nd s me fin ally recogni zes th em as se nseless, when he has climbed out through th em, on th em, over th em. (He must so to speak throw away th e ladder, after he has climbed up on it. )
He must sumwunt these fJrofJositions; th en he sees th e world rightly 26 Yet we must also ask how much W ittgenstein thinks that th e enli ghtening power of th e T1·actatus is wrapped up in its stwcture. In other words, is th e "ladder" suitabl e for climbing beca use of its logical structure or, rath er, beca use its "poin t" ca n onl y be go tten by th e reader whose outlook has been transform ed via engaging th e text-as-a-whol e, di alecti cally in th e manner described by Fish? As evid ence of th e form er, we ca n point to th e meti culou attention Wittgenstein paid to th e logical rigo r of th e primary propositions, each predicate becoming th e subj ec t of the foll owing statement, and so on. However, th ere is at least one comp elling reason for rejecting thi s option.
Gottlob Frege, who possessed one of th e brightes t logical minds of Wittgenstein's clay, was judged by Wittgenstein to have entirely mi sund erstood the Tractatus. In a letter written to Russell elated August 1919 Wittgenstein confided that "I gather that he [Frege] doesn't und erstand a word of it all ." 27 How can thi s be? Perhaps we have here a clue that a di alec tical reac~ ing is more important to correct exegesis th an attenti on to th e logical j structure of th e Tractatus. For surely Fregc co uld have followed th e logical ma chin ations of th e Tractatus as well as, or better th an, anyone.
Frege has been cred ited with the removal of th e human subj ec t from philosophy of language by discarding John Locke's "idea"-id ea as mere psychol og ism.
28 Locke had suggested that objec ts and eve nts gave rise to id eas in our mind. We th en subsequ ently affix labels to these id eas in th e form of speech. The upshot of th e Lockean sc heme is th e imposs ibility of a public measuremen t of the correspond ence between a speaker's id eas and words, for only th e speaker has unm ediated access to his or her own id eas. But in consequence ofFrege's suggestion , mod ern philosoph ers oflanguagc no longer troubl ed with th e middl e term of the "word -id ea -world " chain but purported, instead, to do philosophy of language "obj ec tively," by considering only the relation between public se ntences and fJubli c sta tes of affairs.
In telling co rrespondence with Wittgenstein, Frege claim ed th at Tractarian statem ents 1 andz had id enti cal mea nings. Wittgenstein respond ed, 'The sense of both propositions is one an d th e sa me, but not th e ideas th at I associated with them when I wro te them." 29 By th e words, "when I wrote th em," Wittgcnstein may have been trying to draw attention to th e stance a given read er takes toward th e text an d th e fact that any such stance cou ld (as his notebooks show to be tru e in his own ca e), and ought to, change. Wittgenstein felt it absolutely necessa ry to ge t past th e propositions of the Tractatus as he himself had done. Only by doing so might one see th e world rightly. 30 The use of th e adverb "rightly" (richtig) here to modify th e verb "to see" (sehen) was delibera te: Wittgenstein's aim was that th e reader attain a correct manner of viewing rath er th an sec ure a correct pi cture of reality, because, as he would sum mari ze some yea rs later, "th e sea rch says more than th e di scover)',"l 1 ,.,... It should not be surprising, on this account, that Frege, who tri ed to engage th e text on purely objective terms, was bound to mi ss th e point. And it is likewise not surprising th at W ittgenstein himself shou ld go beyond th e Tractatus in sea rch of a more fitting pedagogy.
Content vs. Style r-()

\
If we accept Wittgenstein~1ction between showing and saying, then we can get past th e qu es tion of whether th e Tractatus is self-consistent in what it says in order to address th e second, deeper tension in th e Traclcttus: Does what th e tex t show fit its manner of express ion?
Imagine leafing through a philosophy journal which contains an article arguing th at the "real" meaning of some particular poem can be sta ted by proposition X. Imagine further that th e argumen t offered by this author analyzes the poem, lin e by line, reducing each line to symbolic logic. Once the symboli za tion is com plete th e author applies the appropriate logical calculus, retranslates th e symboli c logic into propositional form, and "Presto!" the logically validated conclusion is miraculously id enti cal to the author's thesis. Fra nkl y, we wo uldn 't know what to ·make of such an articl e. The genre in whi ch the poem is discussed is so distant from poetry that we would be justifi ed in won dering, not merely whether th e author is reading this particular poem rightly, but whether the author knows what it means to read i poetry at all. This illustration shows th e way genre and style must "fit" th e message if th e text is not to be self-d efea ting. Lawrence Hinman puts it in th e strongest terms:
what one is saying se ts the limits of valid philosophical di sco urse . A philosophi ca l style is wrong when it naively steps outside th e limits which are being es tablished by what i being sa id, i. e., when th e presuppositions of a certain mode of speaking contradict what is being sa id n Are th e style and genre of th e Tractahts "wrong"? Wittgenstein certainly chose hi s style delibera tely. Fearing th e readers might miss the logical scaffoldin g of the text (by read ing it as a uni-dim ensional treatise), Wittgenstein refused to have the Tractatus published in stages (as one potential publisher offered 33 ) and also refused to omit the d ecima ls .~ Only in its final form did Wittgenstein think that the Tractatus counted as both philosophy and th e • sort of litera ture th at in its artform could show what could not be sa id, namely, th e relation of language to th e worlcJ.l~Wittgenstein had already grasped th e intrinsic difficulty of using language to say how language relates to th e world (a "discovety" sometim es attributed to th e Wittgenstein's "later" philosophy), sin ce th ere is no way to transcend language to speak about it. The naive realist claims th at language "pictures" th e wo rld but is th en hardpressed to produce a criterion by which th e putative correspondence between a proposition and a state of affairs can be measured. (Where could one stand to make such a call? And with what language might this be expressed?) Thinkers from Bertrand Russell (Wittgenstein 's mentor at Cambridge) to Polish logician Alfred T~mki have typically answered this objection by positing a high er order lan guage (what Tarski ca lls metalanguage) comprised of word s like 'rep rese nt' and 'correspond ' in order to refer to th e relationship between "lower-order language" and "the world ." But, of course, it is always fair to ask for the criteri a aga inst wh ich metalanguage ca n be checked for correct employmen t. Thus an infinite regress.
-~ Wittgenstein avo id ed the probl em of correspondence altogether. He bega n with th e claim th at th ere is no way to utili ze language to describe th e extra-lingui sti c means by wh ich it corresponds with states of affa irs. 4. 12 Propositions ca n represent th e whole rea li ty but th ey ca nnot rep resen t what th ey must have in common with rea li ty in ord er to represent it-the logica l form.
To be able to represent the log ical form , we should have to be able to put ourselves with th e propositions out id e of logic, that is ou tsid e the wo rld .
The propositi ons show th e logical form of reality. They ex hibit it.
(G ranted, Wittgenstein assumed that language models or "pictures" th e ~o rld , but of grea ter interes t to him was how thi s picturing works. 36 He reasoned that th e way pictures represent is by holding something in com mon with what is pictured. Both the pi cture and th e pi ctured have th e sa me "form." For example, th e form that a photograp h share with the room it depicts includes things like spatial relati ons (e.g., "to th e right of") and color relations (e.g., "is bluer than"). For Wittgenstein , "form " connoted th e entire logical space th at a state of affa irs embodi es. The logical form marks th e boundari es of th e world, th at is, of th e limits of all logically possible arrangements. To th e ex ten t that language pictures th e world, it too shares this form.
Thus, th e only co rrespond ence worth troubling about is th e co rrespondence between the form of th e wo rld and th e syntax of language. Here it wo uld be better to say that th e ",eorre pond ence" of language to th e world is th e co-parti cipati on oflanguage an d world in logica l Form. This is why Wittgenstcin could write that for all sensible propositi ons, "th e propositions 'f/ and '~p ' have opposite se nses, but to th em co rresponds one and th e sa me real i ly."
37
So th en, in Wittgenstein 's thinking, "reality" or "th e world" enco mpasses all possible cases, and thi s world is bounded by logical form .
5.61
Logic fill s th e world: the li mits of th e wo rld are also its limi ts.
Howeve r, sin ce language also embodi es this fo rm , we ca nnot say what logica lly we ca nn ot thin k. 38 T he diffi culty th at face d Wittgenstein beca me ap-) pa rent in his rea liz~ti o n th at if"form " is th e means by whi ch r. epresentati on occ urs, then form 1tself cannot be represented, p1ctmed, or spoken. But by th e sa me token, how ca n he claim to kn ow it and even be so presu mptuous as to give it a name? Aga in th e distin ction between showing and saying co mes to th e re ·cue.
In Wittgenstein 's ea rly view, we perceive form directly with out th e medi ati on suppli ed by language . To put th e point di fferentl y, if we grasp a proposition (or a photograph ) as a fJicture, rather th an as an artifact, we have already grasped its form . We wo uld not kn ow what to ma ke of a person who sa id, "Yes, T ee that is a pi cture of Mt. Raini er, but how do I kn ow th e form is the sa me in both cases ifi ca n't spell it out?" Form is not elusive for being un saya ble but is eve rywhere immediately present to us in each recognition of a pi cture as a picture. Wittge nstein hoped th at for all its literally nonsensical propositions about un saya ble things, th e T'ractatus shows what ca nnot be said. If th e Tractatus is a picture, it must already embody in its crystall ine structure th e form of th e wo rld. Hinman desc ribes it th is way:
Thus th e grammati ca l simpli city of th e ma in propositi ons in th e Tractatus, th e ord erlin ess of th e prese ntati on, th e way in whi ch ce rtain propositi ons stan d out as fund amental an d oth ers are given as derivati ve, and th e ve ry fin ality that characterized Wittgenstein 's pronoun cements are all aspects of his styl e wh ich seem to refl ect th e basic claims abo ut th e relati onship be tween language and th e wo rld developed in th e Tractatus.
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T he logica l structure of th e Tractatus, whi ch constitutes, in part, its genre, succeeds in showing th e logical scaffolding of th e wo rld. Ye t, in th e midst of th is show ing, as Frege compl ain ed, th e th eses appea r to lack adequ ate support. 40 T his, of course, anti cipates Wittgenstein 's later claim th at if th ere / we re uch things as th eses in phil osophy, th ey wo uld be self-evid ent.
41 But in th e Tractatus, this lack shows something th at is of the grea test importance to W ittgenstein. Seen in all its logical reli ef, th~eve n th eses of th e Tractatus display th e limits of language. __....
.. W iltgenstein's style in th e Tractatus is di ctated by two considerations: on th e one hand , th e ultim ately simple and uni vocal character of the relation between language and the worl d mea ns th at th at wh ich shows itself here ca n indeed show itself once for all in its fund amen tal form ; on th e other hand , th e fa ct that sayin g must be replaced by letting something show itself means that language in this context must almost have th e terseness of a gesture. 42 So far, so good. Once Wittgenstcin bega n to think in terms of th e human capacity to perceive form direc tly, th e focal point of philosoph y al o bega n to change for him. In creasingly, th e big question of philosophy of language was not whether the correspo nd ence between language and world could be demonstrated in some subj ec t-neutral way, but whether we as human speakers were ski ]led enough to recogni ze the limits of language. ( Thus, th e first two tensions in th e Tractatus ca n be und erstood as antici-( ~ting W3enstein 's turn to the subj ect. The third tension that und ermin es the apparentTractarian message th at human subj ec ts are in cid ental to philosophy is th e fa ct th at the style of th e Tractatus also displays th e narrative <(!ihape of Wittgenstein's own conceptual journey. This tension beca me unbea rabl e for Wittgenstein and ultim ately drove him to return to academia after his premature "retiremen t" from philosophy.
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The Storyline of th e Tractatus ?
In a letter to Ludwig von F icke r, probabl y written in November 1919, Wittgenstein explained that th e Tractatus conta ined "that which rea ll y occurred to me-and how it occurred to me."H At face valu e this may only mea n that Wittgenstein claimed th ese thoughts as his own . But it also may I~ be an allusion to . tl . ac~t th e "logical" progress ion of th e Tractatus was roughly an~ _ o wgraph1_:a!jne. We can chscove r th e relatJon between th e logical progression -of th e Tractatus and th e chronological progress ion ofhis sourcebook for th e Tractatus, th e Notebooks [1914] [1915] [1916] , by mapping the decimal number of eac h Tractarian statement against th e date of th e parailel entry in the Notebooks: sta tement 2.17 corresponds with th e entry for October 20, 1914, statem ent 3.001 with that of November 1, 1914, and so forth _-IS What we find is expressed by th e fi gure th at follows. There are two striking features of th e distribution. First is th e 198-day gap in entries between Jun e 22, 1915, and April15, 1916. 46 Second , despite this gap, th e development of Wittgenstein 's thought during th e entire period is expressed by the straight lin e that diagonally bisec ts th e graph. I am not suggesting that thi s correlation is proof positive of an expli cit hi storical developm ent in Wittgenstein's thinking. The correlation itself may re Aect I am sugges ting th at the figure illustrates th e possibility of an intrinsic rela-'•* tion ship between his life story and th e logical stru cture of the Tractatu0 0n this view, Wi ttge nstei n's own life reRec tecl what th e Tractatus advoca tes; as hi s thinking advanced in tim e he sys temati ca lly discarded eac h "rung" of the lad der he had constru cted. In other words, th e Twctatus chronicles Wittgenstein's own conceptual transform ation en route to th e in effa ble realm of das Mystiche. His deca de-long hiatus from philosoph y after writing th e Tractatus is evid ence th at he hSid surmounted th e entire ladder. Th is -surprising result reveals th at the Tractatus, despite it austere, objective, and totalizing logical stru cture, neverth eless co ntains a hidden map of Wittgenstcin's own life. Far from being marginalized, th e philosophizing subj ec t-; namely Ludwig Wittgcnstcin -is at th e ve ry hea rt of th e Tractatus.
Wh at ca n be concl uded from th ese data? F irst, if my suggesti on is co rrect, Wittgenstein 's expli citly di smiss ive attitude towa rd human subj ec ts engaged in phil osophy stands in las ting tension with the autobiographi cal fl ow of th e Tractatus itself, a te nsion th at draws attention to th e poss ibility that human subj ects such as W ittge nstein could und ergo profo und conceptual transformation. T he h ope for suc h transformati on was to becom e central to his rapidl y matur iug phil osophi cal outl ook. Seco nd , th e overt stru cture of th e Tra ctatus-as shown by th e dec im als-barely conceals th e narrative stru c ture embedd ed in th e eluc id ati ve rem arks of th e text. If th e unity of th e Tractatus is neith er logical nor topi cal but narrative, th en , a fortiori , th e uni ty ofWittgenstein's ea rl y and later wo rks is likewi e th e uni ty of W ittgenstein 's own life. Third, W ittgenstein wrote in hi s preface that h e expected onl y rea d ers of the Tractatus "who have th em selves a! ready th ought th e th oughts which are expressed in it -or simil ar thoughts" would be able to und erstand th e Tractatus. T herefore, if th e Tractatus contains a record of Wittgenstein 's own journey toward th e ethi cal (and oth er aspects of das Mystische expressed by propositi ons 6 and 7), th en it is poss ibl e-even preferabl e-to read th e Tractatus as a m anual for ass isting its rea ders to m ake similar journcys.
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PL AY ING W ITH P E D AGO GY
I have spill ed a lot of ink co rrelating tension s in th e Tractatus with Wittgenstcin's own earl y conceptual journ ey. Wittgenstein's later period bega n with ( an experiment in a pedagogical style that, in effec t, inve rted th e pri ori ty of ( th e Tractatus~s logical stru cture: th e fo r~c rl y insignifi cant elucidations beca m e th e chi ef m ea ns In di ssolvm g phil osophi cal pu zzles, whil e th e form e rly param ount philosophi cal th eses com e to b e ex Josed as l anguage gon e haywire . T hi s ca n be see n very cl earl y in hi s "Lecture on E thi cs" (1929) , PhilosofJhi cal Remarks (ca . 1930) , and "Rem arks on Fraze r's G olden Bough" (begun in 1931). But pe rhaps th e m ost important wo rk fo r eeing hi s ch anging styl e is th e so-call ed Big Ty fJescrifJt .
T h e histori cal context of th e Big TyfJescript is far different from th at of th e Tl·actatus. T h e latter was drafted in th e isolated and auste re mounta in s of Norway and th en pi eced togeth er whil e Wittgenstein was on th e Russ ian front. During this peri od, Wittgenstcin was joined to th e grea ter academi c community only by an occas ional letter. In contras t, th e Big TypescrifJtth e bulk of whi ch ha s been recentl y publish ed in E ngli sh as th e Philoso fJhical Grammar-was construc ted after W ittgenstein h ad re turn ed to philoso ph y from a decade hi atus and deepl y ensconced himself in Ca mbridge aca demic life, having honed hi s pedagogical skills on two yea rs of live class room lectures. T he ... aroma of "le_s!!dre" permeates th e Big Ty{Je-f scri{Jt and gives it more th e lo6'k and feel of anj;!.troductory textbook than any of th e rest of Wittgenstein's writings. W ittgenstein himself admitted as mu ch in a marg inal note un cove red by Rush Rhees : "My book might be ca ll ed: PhilosofJhical Grammar. T his titl e wo uld no doubt have th e smell of a textbook title but that doesn't matter for behind it th ere is th e book." 48 Among those fea tures that contribute to th e "textbook smell " is the attentiOJl.,Pa id directly to th e reader-as-pupil. As in his Cambridge lectures, W ittgenstein does all th e talking. The reader is trea ted as a merely pass ive recipient of informati on. However, that the reader is included in th e frequent "we" and "us" that litter th e pages is a notable departure from th e terse gestun~s of-the Tractatus . T he Phi losophical Grammar does not quite fit th e dialogical genre of th e later works (for instance, th e Investigations), nor does it match th e autobiograph ical musin gs of the Phi losophical H.emarks. Rath er, th e genre of Philosophical Gra mmar might more appropriately be labeled "transcribed lec ture."
The orga ni za tion al o adds to th e textb ook feel of th e Philosop hical Grammar. Un like the Tractatus, whose tabl e of contents (had one been written) would have bee n id entical to th e book itself, th e tabl e of contents in the Philosophical Grammar does not summari ze an argum ent but, rath er, displays a cqllecti n ofl~lm a rks reminding one of th e journey taken, or anti cipating one to be taken, by t1 e reader. 49 In this way, th e Philoso fJhical ?
Grammar is organ ized "geographi ca ll y" and th e table of con tents serves as ) its roaclm ap or guid e book. However, th e qu es t Wittgenstein imagin ed for hi s reader differs from th e sort of tran sformation Wittgens tein will later seek for readers of the Investigations. Fo r one thin g, th e starting points of the journey-those confu ions tha t are bewitching th e mind of th e reade r of th e Philoso{Jhical Grammar-as well as th e endpoints for each stage along th e way are fi xed by Wittgenstein in advance. T his is why th e Philosophical Gramma r does not "li ve" like th e later dialogical Investigations; th e Philoso{Jhical Grammar ca n on ly engage a reader who fits Wittgenstein's stereotype of "t;Qe..confuse.cl pupil." Perhaps this is also why he neve r was sa ti sfi ed suffi ciently with th e manuscript to publi sh it: sin ce th e route was so clea rly mapped out fo r th e stud ent in advance, th e book smacks of being govern ed by th e very so rt of th eoretical age nda th at Wittge nstein was trying to repudi ate.
Imagine th at a form er reader of th e Tractatus picks up th e Philoso{Jhi-cal Grammar and, thumbing through it, pauses to read the conclusion to Part I, Section Ill: "What interests us in the sign, th e meaning whi ch matters for us is what is embodied in th e gramma r of th e sign." What Wittgenstein is talking abou t is amb iguous. T his is because only an insid er-one of th e "us" -ca n properly decode th e message. This is but one exa mpl e of his new pedagogy: the summary statements at th e end of eac h sec tion of th e Philosophical Grammar are not conclusions of argum ents. If th ey were, anyone could get an inkling of th eir sense and take th e further troubl e to read th e entire section only if he or she wa nted to fo ll ow th e justifi ca tion of th e position that th e conclusion summari zed. But th e remarks whi ch terminate a given section of th e Philosophical Grammar do not function as th e co nclus ion of an argument (let alone as a self-evident trui sm). Rath er, th ey functi on as a quiz to test the stud ent's clarity of th ought at just thi s stage of his or her intell ec tu al journ ey. As such , th ey are neve r final destin ation s, ...,but rath e r~~ docking poin t;; th at signal th e co mpl etion on ly of a particul ar leg of a longe r journey to be con tinu ed by engaging followin g sec tion s. Thus what look like philosophi ca l th eses in th e Philosophical Grammar are not, beca use th ey are not universally accessible.
Wh il e th e co nclusions are not unive rsa lly access ible, Wi ttgenstci n does see m to begin th e book with a parti cularly afAi cted stud e nt in mind. For students of philosophy sin ce Frege have been carefu lly school ed to believe, mistakenly, th at "understanding" (whateve r that is) is separable from "language": s 2
How can one talk a bout "und ers tanding" and "not und erstanding" a proposition? Surely it is not a proposition until it's understood ? ...
We rega rd und erstanding as th e esse ntial thing, and signs as so mething in essential. ... T he uninitiated reader is likely to answer th e qu estion of §1, "S urely it is not a proposition until it's und erstood ?" in th e affirmat·ivc, th at is, as a res tatement of Frege's view th at a se ntence ac hi eves th e status of "proposition" if and only if th ere ca n be co rrelated to it som ething ca ll ed its "mea ning." To such a perso n, S1 might also sugges t that th e tec hni ca l term "proposition " be reserved for eac h string of words th at possesses a co rrelative mea ning. But surpri singly, and on th e co ntrary, S1 expresses a double entendre foreshadowing where W ittgenstein wanted to take the rea der. I-Ie was interested not in delinea ting th e logical status of propositions (as he was in the Tractatus ) but in clarifying th e notion we commonly ca ll "und erstanding." He plans to move the student from Frege's mistaken vi ew to his own view th at "und e rstanding" is in ex tri ca bly bound up with the use of language.
After this inten tionally dupli citous start, Wittgenstein parades a se ri es of illustrations and qu estions before th e reader to nudge him or her from the received acco unt of understanding as "seeing" to Wittgenstein's own acco unt of understanding as that whi ch is em bodi ed in one's use oflanguage.
Co nsid er th e following progression of quotations (see p. 32) from th e opening pages of th e PhilosofJhical Grammar coupl ed with descripti ons of th e reader's evolving co nception of "understanding." In a sca nt eight pages of text, th e concept of "understanding" has metamorphosed severa l tim es. F irst, th e notion of "mental seeing" changed to som ething like "translation" and th en again to a concept so fluid it defies definition. W ittgenstein then drew a ttention to th e behavioral compon ent of understanding, and, by linking understan ding with th e abili ty to answer qu es tions like "What does this se nten ce say?" he suggested that rea ders provisiona lly consider und erstanding as so me type of precondition to appli cabon. F inally, Wi ttgenstein guid ed his rea ders to take the now managea bl e step to em bra ce his co nclusion that understanding is best thought of as th e actual appli ca ti on ofla nguage.
-
The ambigui ty with wl1 ich Wittgenste in bega n th e Philosophical Grammar was central to his developing pedagogical method. F irst, th e initial paragraph was deliberately open to a misrea ding whi ch his fol.lowing parade of remarks systematically untangled. Seco nd, th e fac t th atthe openin. g 1;;;tence was vuln e ra bl e to contrary lite ral readings showed th e point h e tri ed to make explicit: to possess und erstanding is to possess th e skill necessa ry for using a string of wo rds according to a range of gram matically allowable comb inations within a given context. T hird, it served as a reminder of th e lesso n lea rn ed . Having rea d it once, th e stud ent who goes back to review sees so me thing entirely different from th e uninitiated person who reads it for th e first tim e. T he answer to "S urely it is not a proposition until it is und erstood?" (S1) is still "Yes," but th e tutored student now realizes tha t th e reaso n this is so is beca use "understanding th e mea ning" is bound up with th e propositi on (i.e., its use) an d not separable from it, as initially presupposed. "In certain of th eir appli ca tions th e words 'understand', 'mean' refer to a psychologica l reaction whil e hea ring, reading, uttering etc. a sentence. In th <l t case understanding is the ph enom enon that occurs when I hea r a sentence in a Familiar language .... " (S3) "U nd erstanding a sentence is more aki n to und erstanding a piece of music than one might think." (S4)
"How curi ous: we should like to explain th at und erstanding of a gesture as a translation into wo rds, and th e understanding of words as a translati on into gestures." (Ss) "Do we understand C hristian Morgenstern's poems, or Lewis Carroll 's poem 'Jabberwocky'? In th ese cases it's ve ry clear that th e conce pt of understanding is a Au id one." (Ss) "To Linderstand a sentence ca n mea n ... to be abl e to answe r th e qu esti on 'what does this sentence say?"' (\ 6) "We speak of th e understandi ng of a sentence as a conditi on of being able to appl y it. We say "I ca nn ot obey an or ler ifJ do not understand it" .... (S8) "'U nderstanding a word' may mean : knowing how it is used; being able to appl y it." (Sw) "Wh en someone interprets, or und erstands, a sign in on e sense or another, what he is doing is taking a step in a calcul us (like a calculation). What he does is rou ghl y what he does if he gives expression to his interpretation." (S13) o (th e assumed starting position of reader: understanding-asmental-sight)
• understanding is taken to be a mental event but, importantly, a mental event which accompanies the activities of using language.
• understanding-as-hearing. What is required to achieve understanding may not be insight but a trained ear or skillful hearing.
• vnderstanding as familiarity with. the connection between words and gestures.
• tmderstcmding as a fluid concept; what understanding amounts to defJends u{Jon each context in which language is used.
• understanding as fJossessing a behavioral comfJonent (e.g., to give a verbal res fJonse in answer to a question)
• understanding as afJrecondition to the afJfJlication of language.
• vnderstanding as the skill of /mowing how to afJfJiy language.
• understanding is identified with the actual afJplication of language.
self-supporting. 'Rather, the firmn ess of th ese logical connections is suppli ed by th e incrementally enli ghtened mind of the reader. As a result, th tabl e of contents is an assemblage of reminders-sometim es phrases, sometim es whole sentences -of th e lessons to be learned in the reading of the whole. In this way, the Philosophical Grammar is a "self-consuming artifact" in a different, though related, sens from that used by Fish: th e Philosophical Grammar consum es not itself, but th e human selves that move through the volume. The read ing of the Philoso{Jhical Grammar presupposes at) every point that the reader has reached a certain level of conceptual clarity \ requisite for th e next peri cope. For example, Section II of Part I asks, "Can what th e rul es of grammar say about a word be de cribed in another way by describing th e process which takes place when understanding occurs?" 50 This sentence only makes sense to someone who co nceives und ers tanding in terms of the rul es of grammar and is not in danger of slipping back into th e sort of mentalism that was di scard ed in the readin g of § §1-13. An uninitiated reader cannot simply clive into a middl e section and "follow th e argument." This is not beca use th e argument is untenable or unclea r, but because participati on requires a reader of a certain sort -one who has been accl imated to the di sc ussion by th e entire sequence of disc uss ion which precedes a given sec tion .
The pedagogical style of the Philoso{Jhical Grammar makes i~y de-__ man ding reading. Its stru cture is ~m:s;hi cal rath er than logical: numbered -paragraphs are rungs of a ladd er scaling a section; sections are rungs on a ladde r scalin g a part; and each part is a rung on a ladder whi ch scales th e whole. The ladder metaphor is, of co urse, borrowed from th e Tractatus. However, in th e Tractatus the point of th e metaphor was to urge readers to di sca rd the ladder once a ce rtain conceptual eleva tion had been atta ined, namely, a God's-eye view (sub specie aetemitatis). In contrast, here th e point is in the climbing. Climbing is strenuou s, and one ge ts the feeling that Wittgenstein expected as much from hi s reader as he did from those live bodi es who struggled along during hi s half-clay lectures. One of hi s stud ents reminisced:
Usually at the beginning of th e yea r Wittge nstein would warn us that we would find hi s lectures unsa ti sfactory, that he would go on talking like thi s for hours and hours and we would get very littl e out of it. Plainly he was sensiti ve to th e sort of audience he had . He wan ted a small gro up of people who, knowing what was in store for them, were prepared to put in a full strenuous year with him learning philosophy. Visitors, even distingui shed visitors, who wan ted to attend a few lectures to "find out what sort of thing Wittgenstein is doing" were not welcome, but anyone was welco me wh o se ri ously wa nted to lea rn [to do] fJhilosofJhy (and not just to hea r Wittge nstcin ). And , if we worked hard , Wi ttgenstei n worked tremendously hard.
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Wittgenstein 's emerging pedagogica l style di splayed in th e Big Ty pescript betrayed th e fact th at he had shifted his attention in philosophy from striving after a view of th e world sub specie aetemitatis to striving after an alteration of th e sensibilities of concrete human beings .
So far, I have tri ed to show th at th e movement of th e subj ect from th e periph ery to th e ce nter of Wittge nstein 's philosophical vision is shown initially by tensions intern al to th e 1922 publication , th e Tractatus, and more full y in his experim entati on with pedagogica l styl e after 1929. Th e shift-in style shows th at th e point of doing philosoph y had changed for Wittge nstein: "A present-day teac her of philosophy doesn't select fo od for his pupil ..:::-with tlie aim of flattering hi s tas te but with th e aim of changing it."
52 Th e goal of doin g phil osophy is not to produce a literary artifac t repl ete with tim eless truth s butto clea r u12 confusions in others' mi11d . In 1933 he wrote • 'bi'"philosophy ought to be written only as_poetic composition."
53 Although Wittgenstein was neve r sati sfi ed that hi s work eve r attain ed thi s level of arti stry, neverth eless, his work docs make th e sa me sorts of demands on a reader that proper reading of poetry does. Readers have to approac h his writin gs deliberately and creatively, with th e commitm ent to inves t tim e and attention to nuan ce and subtle detail. At tim es one's investm ent seems fruitless. But as Wittgenstein once commented to Drury, "Philosoph y is like tryin g to open a safe with a combin ation lock. Each littl e adjustm ent of th e many dials seems to ac hi eve nothing, only when all is in place does th e door open." 54 Evid entl y Wittgenstein felt justifi ed in placing large demands on hi s would-be stud ents precisely beca use of th e way he cam e to conceive philosoph y. Students during th e Mi c haelm as 'l crm 1930 quoted Wittge nstein as saying: "The nimbus of philosoph y has been los t. Fo r now we have a method of doing phil osoph y, and ca n spea k of skillful philosoph ers."
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WiLtgenstein did not have a philosophical th eory. Rath er, he proposed a method by whi ch conceptual confusions in the minds of concrete subj ects mi ght be di ssolved . Philosophy becom es, in short, a kind of conceptual uth erapy." 56 -------wittgenstein felt that he had reached a "re<l l res ting place" in hi s conception of philosophy as th erapy. 5 7 Wh en philosophy is deemed "good," th e term is not a stamp of approval on a book's argum ent but an adj ec ti ve that praises the ski ll of the therapist who helps others clarify their cloudy thinking. However, Wi ttgenstein grew uneasy with th e textbook feel of these first attemp ts at therapeutic philosop hy. What eme rges in Wittgenstein's most mature wo rks might be ca ll ed aporetic philosofJhy. In th ese works we see Wittgenstein's true ge nius displayed. Rather than crea ting more textbooks to se rve as self-h elp manuals for students beset by a parti cul ar set of confusions, in th e later works Wiltgenstein reproduced conversa ti ons he had hcidwith himself that, because of th eir aporetic character, engage reader who uffer from a wi de range of befudcllements.
CHANGING THE SUBJECT
The developm ent of Wittgcnstein's later thinking is partially obscured by th e nature of hi s posthum ously published works. In nea rly every case, eac h vo lum e was originally conceived as notes for lec tures given during his tenure at Cambridge. The troubl e with lecture note , of co urse, is that as the years pass a teacher is constantly having to begin at th e beginning with a new, whi ch is to say uninitiated, batch of pupils. For this reaso n, any progress Wittgenstein himself made in crack ing probl ems th at were as "hard as granite" would be lost on new students until th ey had first worked through easy probl ems en route to grappling with the more difficult ones. 58 Of co urse, th ere ca n neve r be enough tim e in th e course of even a bright stud ent's tenure to ca tch up with th e I ikes of Wi ttge nstein. Beca use of this distance, th e lec tures, eve n those he cli ctatecl, were for Wittgenstein th e pedagogica l equivalents of middl e axioms, comments that were tailored to nudge a parti cular group of stud ents along but for whom th e step to co nceptual clarity was too great to be made all at once. Therefore, th ese comments may be at tim es poor refl ec tion s of Wittgenstein 's own thoughts. We are thus amiss to read th e Blue and Brown Books, or th e Lectures 6 Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief as tran sc riptions of Wittgenstein's mature thinking. As he explained to Russell, he di ctated th e notes known as th e Blue and Brown Booles so that his students, not th e res t of th e worlcl ;s rea ders, would have som ething to take hom e in th eir . .
• hands. 5 9 In fact, Drury reports that Wittgenstein fea red th at student notes migh t be published as a record of his considered opinions (such as was clone in th e case of Lectures 6 Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief) 60 I am not sugges ting th at Wittgenstein thought that publishing a philoso phi cal book was imposs ibl . Rath er, he thought th at it must be a work of genius. Only S S1-188 of th e Philosophical Investigations came close to meeting Wittgenstcin 's own rigorous stanclards 61 The eli tingui shing mark of th e Investigations is its genre. Gone is the severe architec tonic of the Tractatu.s and in its place is a string of numbered paragraphs that cannot even be summarized by a table of contents (as per Philosophical Grammar). The invisibili ty of an expli cit organizing principle and th e apparent lack of th emati c unity give the Investigations th e appearance of randomnc?s-as if each pericope were a sta nd-alone ap11ori sm or thought-for-the-day journal entry. However, Wittgenstein deliberately crafted th e Investigations and regretted that its style in particular had become for him a source of van ity 62 What was this style and why was it bri lliant? First, in a manner far more expli cit than that found in th e Tractatu.s, W ittgenstein 's later style displays the narrative, or autobiographical, unity of th e work. When Wittgenstein compil ed the Investigations from hi s journal entries, he took great pains to prese rve th e di ary-like quality of the tex t. He knew that hi s notebooks were not simpl y a compendium of isolated proverbs. Rather, hi s entri es were th e unifi ed express ion of hi s own story, hi s own " journ ey" to conceptual clarity; th ey were, so to speak, hi s own Confessions. ~ ...., Wittgenstcil.l was quite taken by Augustine's Confessions. Drury reported u1 at he kn ew ht s way around th e Latm tex t well enough to find favo nte passages qui ckly. 63 Even th e casual reader must acknowledge th at th e Confessions is not a theological trea ti se but an autob iograph ical acco unt of th e path taken by one who came to be "made gentl e by [God's:l books" and whose "wounds had been treated by [God's 1 soo thing fin gers." 64 But whereas Augustine's Confessions are retrospective musings after th e fact of his character transformation , the Investigations is a record of conve rsa tions Wittgcnstein had with himself in th e course of hi s struggle to~a rcl character/ tran sformation. On ly the transform ation of charac ter rea d1 ed one fo r th e sea rch for truth, beca use chara cter alone was th e lens th at co uld conce ntrate whatever li ght was ava ilabl e into a single "burning point." 65 Wittgenstein viewed character as th e courageous and self-d enying manner in wh ich a person fa ced truth wit:1 practi ced regularity:
No one can speak the tuuth ; if he has still not mastered himself. He cannot speak it;-but not beca use he is not clever eno ugh yet.
The truth ca n be spoken only by someon e who is already at home in it; not by someone who still li ves in falsehood and reac hes out from falsehood towards truth on just one occasion. 66 T he qu est for charac ter, th erefore, was fo r W ittge nstein a pass ionate qu es t fo r a ce rtain kind of life. Quoting Less in g with grea t emphasis, 1ttgenstein remarked to D rury~
If God held closed in hi s ri ght hand All truth , and in hi s left th e single and untiring stri ving after truth , adding even that I always and forever make mi stakes, and said to me: C hoose!", I shoul d fa ll humbl y befo re hi s left hand and say: "Fa th er grant me! th e pure truth is for yo u alone." 67
Wi ttgenstein ackn owledged th e un ending nature of hi s struggle wh en he ad mitted th at "My thinking, like everyone's, has sti cking to it th e shrivel ed remains of my ea rli er (with ered) id eas ." 68 T he fac t th at Wittgenstein was aware of hi s own con ceptual transform ati on, one whi ch wa s both progressive and ye t eve r in compl ete, gives th e J;1vestigations an open-end ed texture. As we shall see, th e In vestigations was mo re th an simpl y autobiographi cal. Clea rly, th e se nse of progress one ge ts by moving from page to page through th e text is not a property of th e text qua text, as if th e Investigations were orga ni zed topically or logicall y or chronologicall y. But it is also more th an a reco rd of Wittgenstein 's journey. Rath er, th e se nse of progress in volves the self-awareness that l, as a reader, am also having my way of seeing re-tooled and thus I am coming to con ceive th e wo rld differentl y; th e progress is my own conceptual transform ation . Only to th e extent that th e Investigations maps out my journ ey will I be able to see its narrative unity. Second , Wittgenstein 's st rle is ex )li citl y dialogical. Jane Heal argues ) th at if th e typi cal aim of phil osoph y is to constru ct firm er positions on life's < most im porbm t qu esti ons by mea ns of di scursive rationality, th en Wittgenstcin 's choice of a di alogical genre is self-defea ting 69 lt has been sugges ted th at Wittgenstein 's deliberate obsc urity was intend ed to ove rturn "philosophy as di sc ursive reasoning" in favor of insight ga in ed some oth er way (perhaps by mea ns of poe lly or mysti cism). 70 As we have seen, th ere is more th an a hint of thi s strategy in th e Tractatus. But Heal ri ghtl y notes th at thi s altern ative simpl y se ts up a di chotomy between insight ga in ed di scursively and insight ga in ed in oth er ways. In fac t, th e later Wittgenstein is challenging thi s di chotomy altogether; clarity in thinking is ac hi eved not by a pass ive fl ash of insight (wh ateve r th at might mea n), but by ac tive parti cipation of th e human subj ect in both practi cal and theoreti cal activity. 71 Heal concludes th at th e di alogical form is parti cul arly appropriate for W ittgenstcin not just beca use it is li vely and ge ts th e reader engaged but beca use of something about th e content of 'th e message' he is tryin g to ge t across, or, better, something abou t th e nature of lh e state whi ch is th e hoped-fo r upshot of an atten ti ve and sympath eti c rcading. 72 fn oth er wo rds, it is of no use to discuss general types of insight when th e ) onl y species of und erstandin g is th at whi ch is possessed by thi or that ) human subj ect under thi s or th at se t of conditi ons. Wittgcnstcin is not trying to construct a stan d-alone argumen t in th e In vestigations. Rath er, he is trying to cultivate a kill (con ceptual clarily) in hi s readers. Whil e he bemoans th at he lacks th e sort of arti sti c ge nius th at ca n coerce on e to see a work of art in th e right perspecti ve, his strategy is no less brilliant. 73 He paraclcs past th e readers a seemingly endl ess se ri es of paragraph s (whi ch, at bes t, bea r a famil y resembl ance) and a battali on of 784 qu estions with only n o answers, 70 of whi ch are in tenti onall y wron g! 73 Although no tex t ca n guarantee th at it will succeed in teaching its reader how to think rightl yand surely th ere is a bewild ering va ri ety of opinions as to what the later Wittgenstcin was up to-neverth eless, one thing is ce rtain: th e attentive reader mu st struggle if he or she is to read Wittgenstcin rightly.
Th e point of phil osoph y for Wittgenstcin , th en, is not th e conclusion t_?f an argum ent, but th e struggle itself. As Stanl ey Cavell aptl y quips, [Wittgenstein's] philosoph y is interes ted in qu estion s in its own waycall it a way in whi ch th e answe r is not in th e future but in th e way th e future is approac hed, or see n to be unapproac habl e; in whi ch th e journey to th e answer, or path , or tread, or th e trad es for it, are th e goa l of it. 75 l-Iene e, while th ere are scatte red and inc onsistent marks of an interloc utor(s) in Wittgenstein 's "dialogue," th e tru e interl oc utor of th e Investigations is th e reader whom Wittgenstein seeks to engage in life-b·ansforming struggle.
This, th en, shows th e second way Wittgenstein 's later-peri od writings express th e centrali ty of th e human subj ec t for hi s philosoph y.
76 Not onl y does his styl e admit to possess in g a "narrati ve unity"; by empl oy ing ave rsion of dialogue, Wittgcnstein se ts before his reader an obstacle course th e purpose of whi ch is to reconfigure his reader's way of seeing 77 1'his way of putting things makes Wittgenstein out to be more of a moral sage than an an alyti c philosoph er. 78 Th ere is som e credibility to this charge because, in additi on to bein g autobiographical and dialogical, Wittgenstein 's style of -philosophy is, third, deliberately therapeutic.
Paul Engelmann, an architec t by trade but, perh aps, one whose greater cla im to fame was to have bee n numbered by Wittgenstein among th e few wh o truly und erstood th e Tractatus, notes in hi s memoirs th e grea t similen ity betwee n Wittge nstein and th e tu rn-of-th e-ce ntury Vienn ese journalist Ka rl Kraus. Kraus insisted th at th e moral chara cter of th e arti st was e scn tial to his or her craftsmanship. Wh en a defect was evid ent in an arti st's work, th at defec t ought to be und erstood as a manifes tation of a moral defec t in th e arti st's charac ter. Kraus furth er main ta in ed th at thi s happens nowhere more frequently than when th e artisti c medium is that oflanguage'>t According to Engelmann , Kraus's claim that "I ca nn ot get myself to accept th at a whol e sentence ca n eve r come from half a man" shows th at "Kraus adopts th e only attitud e th at makes sense by judging th e morality not of an indi vidual act, but of th e person ac ting, and it is th e latter whi ch is un erringly revealed to Kraus th rough language." 79 Kraus's primary conce rn was to "preserve th e puri ty of a language born of crea ti ve poe ti cal experi ence." 80 T hat W ittgenstein shared Kraus's views concerning th e relation of the artist's character to th e quality of hi s or her work is evidenced by his comment published as th e fo reword to Philosophical Remarks: I would like to say "This book is written to th e glory of God," but nowadays th at would be chi ca nery, th at is, it would not be rightl y und erstood. It mea ns that th e book is written in good will, and in so far as it is not so written, but out of va ni ty, etc., th e author would wish to ee it condemn ed. He cannot free it of these imfntrities furth er than he himself is free of them. 81 ittgenstein intention ally poured his life into hi s writing. His writings we re~ not simply an acc id ental refl ec tion ofWiltgenstein's character. T hey we re th e product of a certain kind of devotion, perhaps even religious devotion 82 T hat Wittge nstein co nsidered hi s book a needing to be purged of its impuriti es in order to be a fittin g oblation was but an indi cation that he rega rd ed himself as requi ring purifi ca ti on. Although Wittgenstein was powe rl ess to take hi s book furth er than he himself had gone, he had come thi s far. In th e Tractatus Wittge nstein sought to protect language from th e meddl esom e hands of metaph ysicians, logical positivists, and oth ers who attempt to specify things th at ca n onl y be shown. Wittgenstein 's origina l project, as I read th e Tractatus, was to circumvent defec tive use oflanguage by showing th e limits beyond whi ch philosophi cal language cannot tread.
But hi s "revolution" consisted in thi s: From th e Blue Boo!~ on Wittgenstei n did not simply seck to prevent th e express ion of a speake r's moral defec ts in hi s or her usc of language but sought rath er to cure th e moral defec t itself, that is to say, to tran sform th e speake r's charac ter by engaging him or her in a struggle for co nceptual clarity. Here "conceptual clarity" is not simpl y a cogn iti ve state (For cognitively impaired people ca n develop character) but additionally in volves adopting th e ri ght so rt of stance (o r "good j will" ) toward th e world-for exa mple, th e co urageo us surrend er of one's craving for explana tion or of one's craving to say what ca n only be shownthe progressive attainment of which stance cons titutes one's chara cter.
Perh aps now we arc in a pos ition to see the way in wh ich "th e centrality of th e subject" in W ittgenstei1 'slater work determin ed th e similarity h e saw among ethi cs, aesthetics, and philosoph y. In tl1 c T'wctatus 6.421
Wittgenstein wrote: "E thi cs and aesthetics are one." This amb iguou claim is open to seve ral lin es of interpretation . First, a common turn-ofth e-century reading ass um ed that ethi cs, religion, and aesthetics shared th e common fate of being literall y mea nin gless . A strict th eo ry of representationali sm delineated between those statem ents that co uld be empirically verified and those statements (not only ethi cal, rei igious, and ac th e ti c statements, but "countless" kinds of statements, as Wittgcnstcin would wryly observe later) whose only poss ibl e significan ce was assumed, by default, to 1 ic in their function as express ions of human value, experi ence, or emotion. In thi s vi ew, all such "pseudo-propositions" were unified by not being about anything at alJ.S'
If th e first way to rea d th e enigmatic "E thics and aesthetics are one" is to consign both to th e fate of being about nothing, a seco nd way to read thi s statement is to und erstand ethics and aesthetics as sharing equally multifariou s origins. This is the tack taken by D. Z. Phillips in his essays coll ected under th e titl e Inten1entions in Ethics 8 4 Wh il e aesthetic taste can, to some degree, be schooled, ultimately words such as "beauty" name a famil y resem blance that defi es general trea tm ent. The same holds For judgments of ethical value. Th e rea l danger, warns Phillips, is th e di stortion that ar ises when we succumb to our crav ing for genera lity and try to subsume ethics (or aesthetic ) und er a general theoretical fram ework. Moral (and aesthetic) judgment can be school ed, but sin ce each instance of moral education presupposes a correlative communal form of life, aspirin g to trans-communal (or, in Phillips's case, acommunal ) moral judgment would be pointless. If th e real danger for ethi cs and aesthe ti cs li es in th e distortion that a unifying theory brings to incommensurable valu e judgments, th en th e philosoph er J is obliged to perform interven tions to thwart th eoretics and leave everything as it i .
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But th ere is a third way of understanding th e unity of ethi cs and aesth eti cs that is more in line with Wiltgenstein's emphasis on changing human subj ec ts. Benjamin Tilghman links th e meaning of th e Tracta ri an maxim to th e broader context of th e T'ractatus and shows that. ethi cs and aesthet-JCS are unified by a joint conc er.n.lor th e trul y important in human life.
Sin ce th e realm of valu e ca nnot be spoken, but mu st be shown , Ti lghman spec ul ates that for Wiltgenstcin only through art can th ese va lu es be shown. This is poss ibl e beca use art expresses th e human spirit in th e sa me way that my world is an express ion of my spirit when I view it sub species aetemitatis.
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As desc ribed above, Wittge nstcin abandoned th e hope of viewing th e world from a God's-eye view (sub s{Jecie aetemitatis), but reta ined the view that contemplating th e interconnected ness and limited character of the wm·ld was of utm ost ethical importan ce. The upshot of this line of reasoning is th at the morally good life is one li ved in agreement or cooperation with th ese limits. Art celebrates our ability to see rightly, or in th e right perspec ti ve, by showing al l th e connections of an object with its surroundings . Conversely, grasping a work of art is much like contemplating a world in miniature:
Th e work of art shows us th e essence; it shows us the objec t in its necessary connections with other things and it shows th e scene portrayed as th e logicall y necessa ry unily of the various artistic elements that compose it. And it is tempting to beli eve that thi s is part of what it mea ns to see th e ob jec t in right perspec tive.
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And perhaps this is what Wittgenstein meant by saying, "a work of art forc es us-as one might say-to see it in th e right perspcctive." 88 Beca use a work1' of art manifests all th e connection of an object with its con text, it is, in one sense, a self-co ntained wo rld. But in contrast to a work of art, whose hermeneutic key is intern al to th e work itself, life strikes us as an unsolvable riddl e. Tilghman argues that Wittgcnstein used thi s comparison of art (aesth etics) and life (e thi cs) to di splay th e point that there is no riddle for us to solve. 89 The rea l probl em is the how, not the why, of li ving. Consequently, on Ti lghman's vi ew, to li ve rightly is to look at th e world rightly, which is to say, und er an aspect that di ssolves th e "riddle." Tilghman describes Wittge nstein as seeing ethics and aesthetics internall y related to the character of th e human subj ec t, beca use both require judgments that are express ions of character:
A p erson's vi ew of th e wo rld and tha t person 's ch aracter a re intimately \ intertwin ed; they are, to all purposes, one. A person's view of th e wo rld determin es his character; his charac ter and h ence his view of th e world , is revealed in his d eeds. T h e important thin g is not so mu ch what is don e, but how it is done and th e spirit with whi c h it is don e . W ith out thi s link of ch arac ter, spirit and vision to action th ere ca n be n o eth ics and no moral assessm ent of a dccd 90 Th is is a good desc ripti on as far as it goes. H owever, T ilghman misses th e social charac ter of ethi cal and aes th eti c judgm ent. Wittgen stein is quite expli cit on thi s poin t. In his Lectu.res 6 Conversations he (reportedl y) said , "In order to ge t clear on aes th eti c wo rds yo u h ave to desc ribe ways of li ving."91 I contend that Wi ttgenstcin m aintain ed th ro ughout hi s life that th e unity of ethi cs, aesth eti cs, and religion was a uni ty deri ved fro m th e fac t th at all rely on th e sa me sort of skill s upon whi ch th e social m edium ofl anguage depends.
Certainl y by 1933 Wittgenstein had com e to think of aesth eti cs as desc riptive. "All that Aesth eti cs docs is 'to draw yo ur attenti on to a thing', to 'place things sid e by sid e' ." 92 Here th e co nn ection s m anifested by a wo rk "-.of art are suc h th at to see it ri ghtly m ea ns seeing its conn ections with lifethough not conn ec ti ons with th e artist's inn er life only, but with th e hi story, context, culture, and conventi ons of artisti c pra cti ce as well. H owever, th e person who has com e to grasp th ese conn ec ti ons ca nn ot be sa id to have a handl e on th e causal conn ection s as if h e or sh e possessed an answe r for wh at makes som ething bea utiful. Rath er, th ose who grasp th e connection s between a work of art and its broade r co ntext can be sa id to have developed a sort of flu ency in th e language of th e craft. T hus, Wittgenstcin views the appre he nsion of a com positi on's "n 1eaning" as a tra in ed capacity or skill. For example, Th e direc tion: "Wie a us weiter Fern e" in Sc hum ann . M ust everyon e understand such a direction ? Everyo n e, fo r exa mpl e, who would understand th e direc ti on "Not too qui ck?" Isn' t th e capac ity th at is supposed to be absent in th e m eaning-blind m an one of this kind ?
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W ittgen stein's point is that onl y th e skillful are abl e to rightl y judge what Schuma nn m eant by "pl aying a pi ece as if from afar" or wh e n the tempo is "not too qui ck." Such a skill , or Au ency, is developed by a certa in sort of training 9 4 "You ca n make a person see what Brahms was dri ving at by showing hi m lots of diffe ren t pieces by Brahms, or by com paring hi m with a contempo rary author." 95 In oth er words, inducti on into th e prac ti ce ca n tun e one's ea rs to th e language of music.
Suppose you hea r a piece of mu sic in whi ch you judge th e bass to be "too heavy." In making such a judgment, Wiltge nstein obse rved that "what we are trying to do is to bring th e bass 'nearer to an ideal', th ough we haven't an ideal before us whi ch we arc trying to copy." 96 Ju dgments of"bea uty" are not straightfo rwa rd proced ures as one mi ght check th e spelling of words on this page by look ing up eac h wo rd in a di cti onary. Rather, aes th etic judg-tr"l ments arc express ions of sl?ill. This is not to say th at bea uty in art is simply an exp ress ion of solitary human prefere nce, for judgments are shared: agreement in judgment of beauty is one pccics of th e reAexive sort of agreement upon whi ch language depcnds 97 Wittge nstein wo uld later comm ent:
There is a lot to be learn ed from Tolstoy's bad th eori zing about how a work of art conveys 'a feeling'. Wittge nstcin ca lls this an expression of "feeling" rath er than of "a feeling" prec isely beca use it is shared. Neve rtheless, it is not feeling in general. Rath er, art is conventi onal in nature and expresses th e acc id ental form of a parti cular culture's life. We might say that for Wittgenstein , aesth etics is neither universal nor individual is ti c, but ethnocentric. G . E. Moore recall ed Wittgenstein's words:
He sa id th at such a statement as "That bass moves too much" is not a statement about human beings at all, but is more like a piece of math emati cs; and th at, if I say of a face wh ich I draw "It smil es too mu ch," thi s says th at it co uld be brought close r to so me "ideal" ... and th at .. . wo uld be more like "solving a math emati cal pro blem." 99
Aes th eti cs and eth ics are judgments of value, but such a value is neith er a self-subsistent idea l, nor th e properly of th e lone indi vidual, nor a ge neral fea ture of humans qua humans. Rath er, th e values that aesthetic and ethi cal judgments expose are those shared by a commu ni ty. In an important sense, these valu es (or at least, agreement in judgments of th em) is what makes a group a communi ty. This being th e case, there is only a nominal difference between skillful aesthetic and ethi cal judgment and skillful parti cipation in oth er social-conventional practices (such as mathematics and language), whi ch together constitute membership in community. This way of viewing things shifts the focus of aesthetics (or ethics) from the values expressed by an artifact (or in an instance of moral reasoning) to the question of whether one has th e skill deemed adequate for ren dering judgmen ts th at stand in agreement wi th those of th e comm unity. It is no secret that Wittgenstein con idered mathematics to be about an agreement in judgments. In th e late 1930s W ittgenstein described his brand of math emati cal constructivism with th ese words: "a mathematician is always in venting new forms of description . Some, stimul ated by practical needs, another from aesthetic needs,-and yet others in a va ri ety of ways." This makes th e mathematician out to be more of an inventor than a di scoverer.1 00 The mathema tician is not a discoverer, sin ce, on Wittgenstein's view, there is no uncharted wild erness ("out the1e") to explore. Similar claims could be made for ethi cs, aesth etics, and ph il osophy. Wittgenstein distanced himself fro m the common notion that ethi cists, artists, and ph ilosophers are pioneer into previously uninhabited metaphysical jungles. Ethi cal, aesthetic, and ph ilosophi cal puzzlement are not instances of someone being lost or of something being hidd en. Rather, puzzlement poin ts to a deficiency in human skill to see what is already before one as the solution itself. In a pa renthetical remark, Wittge nstein stated:
Here we stumble on a remarkable characteristi c phenom enon in ph il osophical investiga ti on : the difficulty-I might say-isn't one of finding th e solution; it is one of recogni zing something as the solution. We have already sa id everything. No t something that fo llows from this; no, just this is the solution ! This, I beli eve, hangs together with our wrongly expectin g an explanation; whereas a description is the solution of th e diffi culty, if we give it the ri ght place in our consid era ti on. If we dwell upon it and do not try to ge t beyond it. 101 Accordingly, the task of phil osophy is to cure human subj ects of philosophi cal barbari sm: "A present-clay teacher of philosophy doesn't select food for his pupil with. the aim of fl attering hi s taste, but with the aim of changing it."I02 T he goal of cul ti vatin g good taste-a goal which makes the human subj ect th e centerpi ece of the ph il osophical task -mea nt that Wittgenstein 's approach in philosophy resembled training in art appreciati on. Moo re paraphrases:
He went on to say that, th ough philosophy had now been "redu ced to a matter of sk ill ," ye t thi s sk ill , like other skill s, is very difficult to acquire. One difficu lty was th at it required a "sort of thinking" to whi ch we are not accustomed and to which we have not been trained-a sort of thinking ve ry different from what is req uired in th e sc iences . And he sa id that the required skill could not be acquired by merely hea ring the lectur es : di sc uss ion was essential. As regards hi s own work, he sa id it did not matter wheth er his resu lts [concerning some particular grammatical investigation] were tru e or not: what mattered was that "a method had been found."
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No fine arts instru ctor ca n discursively prove th e grea tn ess of, say, Rembrandt's "The Return of th e Prodigal Son." Rather, an instru ctor shows th e students the painting itself and supplements this showing with descriptions that frame th e painting in a family of other similar paintings and within th e historical practice itself. This descriptive pedagogy at once leaves everything as it is and yet forever alters the stud ents' way of seeing (even if thi s alterati on goes no deeper th an that th e stud ent th ereafter takes Rembrandt as one benchmark for "good" art).
A reader of Wittgenstein 's playful examples ofla nguage-ga mes faces a similar opportunity. In order to grasp what Wittgenstein was up to in th e opening pages of Investigations, th e reader must, provisionally at least, come r \ , to conceive of meaning (e.g., of "Slab! ") as use (i. e., th e builder's request) within a given form of life (namely, the construction of a building) . But to think thi s way requires th e stud ent to suspend both th e craving for a general definition and th e presuppositi on that general definitions cover all the cases. To lea rn, even imagin atively, th e moves internal to Wittgcnstein's initi al (and simpl ifi ed) exam pl e of a language-game constitutes a notion of understanding-as-mastery. Furth ermore, thi s exampl e of a language-ga me is followed by many others, each of which is but a single rung on th e internal ladder that constitutes th e Investigations. In surmounting each rung, progres ca n be made; Wiltgenstein hopes that readers who scale the book will, at th e book's end, have com e to view things so differently th at th ey effec ti vely have ki cked away th e ladder. Readers wh o have atta ined th a t level of sk ill and clarity and who look back at the ea rli e r pedagogical exampl es will im m ediately discern these exa mples to be confused, sim p! is tic, or shall ow.
T h e so rt of progress W ittgenstein h opes fo r hi rea ders lends irony to th e complaint that Rush Rhees voiced in his essay "Wittgenstein 's Builders." Rh ees wondered ifWiltgenstein 's gam es analogy was too simplisti c an account of wh at it m eans to speak. Speaki ng requires m ore th an constru cting gramm ati call y co rrec t senten ces; it in volves hav in g so m e thin g to say whi ch "bea rs on " th e res t of th e co nve rsa ti on. Rh ees charged th a t if th e builders' language-ga m e was imagin ed a a language compl e te in itself, as Wittgenstein enj oin ed us to do, th en th e builders would resembl e puppets more th an human beings . Wo uldn 't th e buil de rs talk about wh at th e building was for, once th e work day was over? Wouldn' t they di sc uss at hom e snags encountered on th e jobsite? Wo uldn 't th ey require entirely different language-gam es for teac hing th eir children? And so on. Rh ees con clud ed that Wiltgenstein 's analogy did not answer what it i to h ave a lan guage beca use it fail ed to show how language is related to th e rest of hum an living .
. . . if [the builders] speak to one anoth er, the m eaning of th e expression they use cannot li e wholly in the use or th e reacti on th at it receives in thi s job . . . . But th e rem arks th ey make m ay have something to do with one another; oth erwise th ey are not talking at all , even th ough th ey m ay be utteri ng se nten ces. And th eir rem arks co uld have no bearing on on e anoth er unl ess th e express ions th ey used were use d in oth er connections as well . 104 Wh at sort of conclusion ca n this be? A better qu estion is, What sort of person is drawing thi s con clusion ? Until his recent dea th , Rh ees was one of W ittgenstein's literary exec utors, not to m enti on a close personal fri end and long-time student. We find in Rh ees, therefore, one who has worked hi s way around th e Wiltgensteinj an corpus many tim es and in m any ways . In short, h e is one who has lea rn ed to "go on." However, Rhees seems curiously unaware that hi s own m a ture facility was hi s teac h er's intention for him all along. In S §1-188 of th e Investigations (whi ch stands out forb ing th e only section of Wittgenstein 's writings with whi ch Wittgenstcin was sati sfi ed ), th e provisional chara cter of th e exercises is evid ent throughout. On th e on e hand , Wittgenste in constru c ts expli c it permuta ti ons of th e o ri gin al language-gam e of th e builders (cf. Sz with S8) . O n th e oth er hand , Wiltge nstein also explicitly expands on th e method expressed in language-ga m e Sz
